Transformative experience, neurotechnology, and disability

Abstract: Since the release of Transformative Experience (2014), philosophers, disability scholars, and bioethicists have explored the relevance of L.A. Paul’s theory for the ways in which medical interventions bring about transformative experiences. According to Paul, there are two ways experiences can be transformative for a person: 1) epistemically transformative experiences, which give new knowledge that cannot be gained except through the experience, and 2) personally transformative experiences that alter a person’s core preferences and sense of self. This panel centers the question of transformative experience on emerging neurotechnologies that target disabilities. If adopting a neural device can be transformative to a disabled person’s knowledge-base or sense of self, what does that entail for how we conceptualize humanity?

Panelist 1 will explain Paul’s theory and discuss how cultural norms mandate that emerging medical technology transform the identity of disabled people through cure, without adequately considering whether that is a desirable goal. Panelist 2 will compare pharmaceutical interventions and neurotechnologies targeting psychological disabilities, arguing both possess transformative qualities that alter core human attributes of mind. Panelist 3 considers participant narratives from an early feasibility study for a novel visual prosthetic device, illustrating the complicated relationship between new sensory information and the ways in which using the device altered participants' senses of self. Panelist 4 will problematize the standard motivations for participant engagement in early neurotechnology studies that intervene on disabilities, which often rely on the underlying logic that using such devices are transformative in either or both of Paul’s two ways.