Abstract: When faced with a moral dilemma, one might consider themselves responsible for the outcome (regardless of the choice one makes). D’Arms and Jacobson claim that there is a right kind of reason and a wrong kind of reason when discussing the evaluative properties of an object. Depending on the evaluative property, our emotions, and evaluative responses can be fitting. In the case of moral luck, we might find ourselves in situations that we have no control over that result in tragedy. This is often seen in the military, where soldiers make decisions that might violate their own moral code or result in moral injury. I argue that the fittingness of our emotions, in particular guilt and moral residue, can depend on the person's identity. I will offer an example where two soldiers of two different backgrounds make the same decision in the same situation but result in different amounts of moral injury and residue. I will also offer a framework as to how we consider moral injury in a broader sense to take into consideration a person’s identity and background.
Learning Objectives:
After participating in this conference, attendees should be able to:
Analyze the concept of moral injury and its relationship with shared identities (cultural, ethnic, religious, etc.).
Examine moral injury through a lens of war or international conflict.
Apply the relationship I argue for to past and present events, acknowledging the significant role one's identity/identities play.
