Abstract: The "moralistic fallacy" has been wielded as a rebuttal against critics of race science, asserting that calls to censor such research stem from an illogical attempt to derive an "is" from an "ought" (Davis, 1978). Frequently championed by proponents advocating unrestricted academic inquiry, this notion is particularly prevalent in contentious discussions surrounding race science (Rushton & Jensen, 2005, 2008). Originating as a philosophical concept and intended as an inversion of G.E. Moore's ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (1903), the moralistic fallacy was conceived by a microbiologist and has not undergone rigorous analytical scrutiny. With the recent resurgence of debates on race and IQ, propelled in part by advancements in genomics and data, the validity of the moralistic fallacy demands examination: is it truly a logical fallacy? This paper undertakes a systematic, analytical evaluation of the moralistic fallacy, delineating three plausible interpretations of the argument. However, each interpretation presents its own set of challenges, ultimately leading to the conclusion that the moralistic fallacy itself is inherently fallacious.
Learning Objectives:
After participating in this conference, attendees should be able to:
What is the moralistic fallacy?
What are the three primary interpretations of the moralistic fallacy?
