Abstract: Recent discussion on bioethics listservs about the Supreme Court of Alabama (SCA) ruling that cryopreserved embryos are legally equivalent to children has again raised the question of ‘what does it mean to be a person?’ Addressing this question is even more pertinent given the conference theme of what it means to be human in light of the rise and use of AI. The SCA explicitly declined to address the implications of their decision on public policy and fertility practices, leaving scholars to debate the ground on which embryos can and should be regarded as persons. In this presentation, I address the topics of what it means to be human and a person. I begin by outlining why there is a concern about regarding both AI and cryopreserved embryos as either as humans or persons. I then briefly offer philosophical and practical distinctions between being human and the concept of personhood. Here, I revisit Singer’s arguments regarding infanticide to show how and why it can be ethically dangerous and disingenuous to flatly dismiss the possibility that AI and cryopreserved embryos are persons. I then briefly make three further arguments for how and why neither AI nor cryopreserved embryos can – or should – qualify as persons, while further arguing that AI is closer to meeting personhood criteria than cryopreserved embryos. Lastly, I offer a consideration for how future debate and policy development that if frozen human embryos are to be regarded as persons, so must AI.
Learning Objectives:
After participating in this conference, attendees should be able to:
Describe several criteria that differentiates persons from non-persons.
Describe what it would take for AI and human embryos to meet personhood criteria.
